Administrative Law: Final Examination (January 1958) by William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Exams: 1944-1973 Faculty and Deans
1958
Administrative Law: Final Examination ( January
1958)
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1958 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/exams
Repository Citation
William & Mary Law School, "Administrative Law: Final Examination ( January 1958)" (1958). Faculty Exams: 1944-1973. Paper 33.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/exams/33
ADNINISTRA TIVE LAH 
Final E~.;:amination January 1958 
1. The Telegraphers ~nicn fil~d e ~omplaint Hith the National Ra ilwa:r .Ll.djustment 
Board that the X Carrler \Va s vlolatlng a contract between the tvlO bec2l'.se the Car-
rier 1-128 using SI11i th, a member of the Railway Clerks Union in one of its offices 
for a job 1-rhich should go to a member of the Telegraphers Union. The Carrier C'.n-
S'Hered and s ai d the ar r:;ument was really betl-men the two Unions and that because 
the National Railway Adjustment Act required that notice be given to all parties 
involved, due notice should be given to Smith &. the Clerks Union. The Boa.rd refused 
to give such notice. 
The Carrier nOvI asks the Federal District Court for an injunction against the 
Board, requiring them to give notice to Smith & the Clerks Union. The Board claims 
th€it they are not entitled to notice Bnd even if they are entitled to it such notice 
need not be given in this case because both Srni th and the CJe rks Union h~d actual 
notice. The Board1s procedure, however, Bllm·JS only those 1"ho are given formal 
notice to be heard. 
Are Smith and the Clerks Union entitled to notice and if so is formal notice 
necessary? 
2. The Lumber and Sa1.-rmill Union filed a cOffiyl aint before the H.L.R.B. a~leging that 
the X Lumber Company was guilty of unf2,i 1' lc~b o:r practices in that it discharged an 
employee for insufficient reasons. A heari:::1g Im s held before an examiner "no is-
sued an intermediate report accompanied by :~inc1in ' s. Tho findin G':s said that the 
employee 1vas 1rrongfully dischar:ged and also i.,hat t e COl"l an had" conducted i tself in 
a Hay Hhich indicated a general hos tili tv in the DC! st to the Union t s acti vi-ties. 
The Board ado ted the intermediate renort as i t s final -de-cisio-;-and issued an;rder 
directing the company to reinstate the el:lployee and further lito cease and desist 
from in any manner interfering '-Jith the :ri~hts of the employees under the National 
Labor Il.elations Act. II 
The Board :re'1uestGd the Di:strict, Court to eni'orce the order. The X Lumber 
Company ans"rered and asked the court to set t he order aside. 
1rJhat ground~ liould the company allege fer having the order set aside, and how 
should the court . rule? 
3. Two applications vrere submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission requesting 
a certificate of conven" a d necessitx to operate a railroad between two named 
points. One application ~'ras by the X RailHay and one was by the Y RailvJay. In the 
X Railway application, Y vJaS allm-red to 3nm-Jer as an interested party and in the Y 
Railway application, X .vas allm-Jea to anS'IJer as an interested party. The applica-
tions were heard before se arate hearin _ exar~,iners. The hearings were substantially 
coordinated but not technically consolidated. The examiners made separate reports 
to the ICC, but the Commission dealt 'lrJi th b oth ap~)lications in a single report. The 
X Reihray application .vas granted but the Y application disal101 .. ed. 
The Y Railway brought an action to have the order of the ICC set aside because 
it alleged that evidence appearing in only one record was used to support findings 
in both cases. To this allegation the ICC demurred. Judgment for IIDom and why? 
4. On 3 October, Cohen "mo was an~mplQye e of the Textile Company an also an 
organizer of theJ.ex±,ile..-..L:.ox r..s. Un" on, passed out applica t ion cards to the entire 
n .... workers of the Textile Company. On 4 October, Cohen vJho l'ras then out of town, 
called Flanagan, the President of the Company , telling him that he had application 
cards from 40 workers and, therefore, he would like to bargain 1fl. th the Company 
as the representa tive of' the workers in the plant. Flana gan expressed doubt as to WV'i . ~ 
the fact that Cohen represented a majority of the workers and refused, after Cohen yl-
suggested, to call in the New York Nediation Board to conduct an election. The ~; i 
, 
Union filed a compalint 'tvith the N.L.R.B. who appointed a beari'Qg examjuer. The .~ ) 
examiner took the evidence, including the testimony of FJ.anagan and Cohen, and find- I.-{ 
ing that Flanagan in "good faith" refuse d to bargain, made an intermediate report _ .• ..P 
recommending dismissal of the co a" t. ___ ~ ---:~{~ 
- Thu.ul Board re sed th examin ' nd uport findin..g hat Flanagan ~cke<i ~~,J 
. "good faIth ) in 1S re us a to ba ", lssued a c~ -n :-a:esls or er against ';..t'''_ 
'the-PeXf:ile Company. Upon petition to the District Court to enforce the order, the ~ ~~ 
Company answered asking tha t the order be set aside. ~ _t-'v 
Judgment for whom? ( ,~ 
;;. 
5. Some refusals of opportunity to be lLezr rely heavily on the idea that hear-
ings are not feasible when a large number of parties may be affected. These cases 
stem from Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado which permitted a blanket increase in valua. 
tion of aIr-Denver pro-perty without opportunity for taxpayers to be heard. Mr. ~' 
J ~~ 
. ustice Holmes declared for an unanimous Court: IttJhere a rule of conduct applies "1 ..., 
Ito more than a few people it is impracticabl e that everyone should have a direct 1c ..-
voice in its adoption • •• There must be 2. limit to individual argument in such -~ 
matters if government is to go on. II The COUl"t distinguished Londoner v. Denver, ~y 
~hich required opportunity to be heard ... nere a local board determined IIwhether, . ~;. _J _ 
' In mat amount, and upon whom ll a tax for paving a street should be levied for ~ .. : ..' 
special benefits, on the ground tha t, "A reletively small number of persons were . y-i ... ::;., r1 
I concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon :individual &:rounds." · .... 
Administrative Law - Final Exa." ination - Jan. 1958 Page 2 
~her courts, follo'~ng this lead , have emphasized the n~mber of parties or have 
made it the sole criteria. 
Requiring a trial in the Londoner case and refusing to require it in the 
Bi-Netallic case may have been thoroughly sound. But the cases should not be 
interpreted as sUPl]Orting the proposition that the requirement of a hearing should 
depend upon the number of parties. 
\'mat should the proper interpretation bC?? 
--' 6. The Price Control Ac . e q., that every wholesaler keep records a.s t ( 
all sales that he makes; and in ad ition, he must keep th~e.-r.ec.o~dS-for ;ns.p~  
by government inspectors. In June of 1958 the O.P.A. issue d a s~na to X re- ::: 
quiring h im 0 appear and to bring his records to a hearing being conducted by the 
O.P.A. on a complaint that X has violated the Act. X 1 S attorney asks the hearing 
examiner if X is immune from prosecution for any evidence he gives, in light of the 
Compulsory Testimony Act vJhich vIi thdraws the privilege a gainst s~f-incrimi.nation 
~ and co s "fummunit from osecution upon any person giving evidence in obedience 
" to a subpoena. The examiner replies th8 t -X- fsenti tled to whatever uri' gE-the 
Act ~fwrs. X then produces the r ecords and answers qu estions concerning them. 
To a question ,.nether he had violated t he Act in any way n o"t! sb mID by t .hed'ecgpis, 
X replied that he ~ tiola:t..e.cL.the-Ac.4: };B- <:..fl:9 res ect i n January of 1958. 
The O.P.A. turned over to the Attorney -aeneral s Office the transcript of its 
hearing and the Attorney General started 2 prosecution against X for the violation 
of the Act in January of 1958 to which he ha d t e . . ed. X claimed immunity from 
prosecution under the Compulsory Testimony Act. iiJill he prevail? 
7. a) The secretary of Agriculture after appro riate hearing, in which Staley 
was not a party, issued an order f ixing the standard of identity for sweetened con-
densed milk. The order requires tha t s li8E tened condense d milk may not contain any . / 
corn syrup, a product produced by St aley. Staley petitions the District Court 
asking it to re,¥ieH the order of the Se cretary. The s t atute under .1,fu~c~ the Sec-
retary acted stated that "any person a dversely affected" may seek Judic1.al review. 
The Secretary claims tha t St a ley has no standLng to seel<: judicial revie'w. Is the 
Secretary right? 
b) The Secretary of Agricultur e after appropriate hearing , in v-Jhich X Cane 
Sugar Co. ' -Jas not a party , i s sue d an. order ~llO\?-n~ , h~ncefort~, for. canners of 
fruit to use dextrose or corn syrup 1.n C 2l!111ng lrU1.t vn.thout dJ.sclos1.ng. ~n t~e 
label that cane sugar '!,vas not used.. The :~ COon e Sugar Co. petitions the D1.st:r:1.ct 
Court askinp: it to revie1i the Qr.d.,er of the :::', e cretary. The statute under winch 
the Secretary acted is the s ame as in questi on 7.a). Does X Cane Sugar Co. have 
standing? 
